In Nigeria, at convocation of
every national discourse, at every agitation of causes for national growth and
development, ethnicised politics is always a default virus. It corrupts the
reasoning of the citizenry; it diverts attention from core issues of national
interest to mundanities and banalities; it changes the supposed narrative of
pan-Nigeria conversation to one where practitioners of ethnicised politics are
more interested in the “Fulani” of the herdsmen than the killings, and as an
antithesis, one where accused ethnic affiliates sweat profusely in defence of
their ethnicity more than condemning the criminality. The triumph of ethnicity
over security in the last conversation that trailed the murderous activities of
herdsmen, in Nigeria, is unfortunate.
In this, our Press is the first
culprit. Agenda-setting theory in political communication explains the strength
of the Press in tele-guiding the populace on what to talk and think about. One
can imagine what the conversation would have been if “Nigerian herdsmen kill
four, injure two” is the screaming headline with no highlight of the needless
ethnic affiliation of the criminals. The sore losers of the last election,
irrespective of their ethnic affiliations, were also catalysts that aided the
agenda of the fifth columnists. It was an intentional narrativist colouration
to paint President Buhari, being a Fulani, as an accomplice and abettor in the
crime perpetrated by the herdsmen –using the brush of ethnicised politics. In
between, there were sincere outbursts from Nigerians who were scandalized by
habitual sluggishness to national emergencies that this administration is known
for.
Let us be clear: “Fulani”
herdsmen do not kill host communities, mostly farmers, or destroy their crops
and plantations, because they are Fulani. They do so, quite unfortunately,
because they are herdsmen. It is, traditionally, a struggle for economic survival
between two asymbiotic “professions”. From the Massai and Pokot people of
Kenya, Turkana in Uganda, and the Fulani in North and West Africa, the
pastoralists’ struggle for survival have always been with havoc unleashed on
farmers, and crops mangled.
With proliferation of fire arms
through our loose borders, self-defence against cattle rustlers, herdsmen are
now armed, and as a consequence, the fights that were earlier fought with bow
and arrow are now fought with AK47. In all, the Fulani affiliation of the
Nigerian herdsmen is a non-entity in solving the crisis; it is a non-variable
in understanding the historical tension; it is not an alibi against stemming
their criminal activities, prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators. It is
just for a purpose: Ethnicised politics to further highlight our fault lines.
This, predictably, shifted a discussion of national interest, supposedly to
centre on proactive countermeasures against continuous experience of such
killings, to ethnic characterisation of the victims and the culprits, and
culpability of the Nigeria state.
We are yet to hear the last of
herdsmen-farmer friction. Hashtags and “Boycott Beef” campaign will not solve
it either. With the ravaging consequences of climate change, desertification of
the Northern Nigeria, movement of herdsmen to Southern Nigeria is inevitable.
Without discounting the fact that the Nigeria police must keep eyes on the
criminals among the herdsmen, a state-backed grazing architecture will
significantly stem the herdsmen-farmer dagger-to-heart, and present our country
as one that has exited the 17th century.
This, therefore, rationally
necessitates deeper engagement with the proposed National grazing reserve bill.
There are possibly contentious provisions in the bill; there could be
nerve-straining clauses, especially for a country of mutual suspicion among its
components regions. Nevertheless, it is a step better than no step. If we
de-ethnicise national debate around this bill, we will surely actualize one
that promotes national interest by solving the herdsmen-farmer crisis that is
gradually replacing the depleting Boko Haram menace.
